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Abstract 
China's phenomenal economic growth has riveted attention on the role of the 
Chinese state. Several models, such as the developmental state, predatory state, 
irresponsible state, state capitalism and centrally managed capitalism, have 
contributed to our understanding of that topic, but none of them can capture 
the dynamism and complexity of the Chinese state's role. Drawing on two cases 
in the petroleum industry, this article argues that a state-management approach 
(SMMA) is in a better position to account for the role of the state and the nature 
of the state–national oil companies (NOCs) ties.1 If most countries embracing the 
market economy can be classiﬁed as a state-in-market paradigm, where state inter-
ventions in economic activities are subject to market forces, China's SMMA can be 
regarded as a market-in-state model, where China's state is superior to the market. 
Keywords: state-managed marketization, China, energy security, petroleum industry 
 
Introduction
The phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy and its remarkable 
achievement in reducing poverty may be the most signiﬁcant recent 
change in the world. Understandably, people are keen on deciphering 
the causes leading to those sea changes. As state–market relations have 
an important inﬂuence on economic performance and distribution of 
economic beneﬁts (Block 1994; Lindblom 1997; North 1990), debates 
arose with regard to the role of the Chinese state. These debates, cover-
ing many different topics, can basically be classiﬁed into three types. 
The ﬁrst type concerns what role the Chinese state has played in 
prompting economic growth. This category can be further divided into 
two types. One is based on value judgments to evaluate whether the role 
of the Chinese state is positive or negative. While the developmental 
state model highlights the positive side of the Chinese state, the preda-
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tory and irresponsible state models can be regarded as the opposite. 
The second type is empirical, trying to uncover how the Chinese state 
intervenes in the economy. In this camp, the state capitalism thesis 
emphasizes government support to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
and sovereign wealth funds. While perceiving China's system as state 
capitalism, the centrally managed capitalism underscores government 
control and sees further consolidation of state power over both politics 
and the economy as a general trend (Lin 2010: 92). If both of the above 
models tend to treat the state and the market as two opposite and com-
peting power arenas, the state–market condominium model is of the 
view that both the state and the market are reciprocal relations (Underhill 
2000; Underhill & Zhang 2005).
The second type of debate is whether the Chinese way of doing things 
is special or a third way compared to other countries' historical experi-
ence in spurring economic growth. Some scholars have borrowed the 
term 'developmental state' to generalize the way of Chinese develop-
ment (Nee, Opper & Wong 2007; Bagchi 2000; Baek 2005; Knight 2012). 
In contrast, Fligstein and Zhang (2009) argue that China may be creating 
its own model of development. By reference to Western practices, the 
thesis of state capitalism has asserted that China's way of development 
differs from the Western market economy system. 
The third type concerns whether China's rise will be a challenge to the 
Western liberal democratic system. In this regard, both state capitalism 
and authoritarian capitalism contend that China's way of governing the 
economy is an alternative to the Western model and poses a threat to 
the liberal democratic system (Bremmer 2010; Gat 2007).
The above competing theses have contributed to our understanding 
of the role of the Chinese state. Their different views and angles coin-
cidentally illustrate the complexity of Chinese economy and society. 
Common in these models, however, is their premise to build their 
arguments. That is, they all presuppose the existence of a monolithic 
state with super strong capability, which can act at will in both deci-
sion making and policy implementation. By contrast, other actors in the 
market are merely the puppets of the Chinese government. We doubt 
such preconditions and put forward a new model of state-managed 
marketization as the alternative. 
Two cases in the petroleum industry will be used to set out the state-
managed marketization approach (SMMA). One is the 1998 industrial 
restructuring that has shaped today's market structure since then, and 
the other is China's oil pricing reform. They are selected because the 
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petroleum industry is deemed an industry of strategic importance that 
the government needs to control. Despite strong government involve-
ment, marketization of this sector is under way. Hence, this sector has 
provided a good window through which we can discern what the Chi-
nese government is thinking and how it acts. Moreover, two cases in 
the same sector are conducive to making inter-case comparisons. 
The next section will substantiate the reviews on the role of the Chi-
nese state in spurring economic growth. The third section elaborates on 
what the SMMA is and why the Chinese government adopts it. With 
two case studies, the following two sections explore how the SMMA 
has been used. The concluding section will analyze the implications of 
such an approach for China's petroleum industry.
The Debate on the Role of the Chinese State 
The spectacular three-decades-long economic growth in China has led 
the intellectual community to contemplate the role that the state has 
played in that process. Policy debates often revolve around three topics. 
First, regarding the role the Chinese state has played, there are debates 
both on a normative and empirical basis. Normatively, the debate has 
often taken a dichotomous approach. On one side are those who argue 
for the developmental state, stressing a constructive role of the state 
in promoting economic growth.2 For instance, Jean Oi (1999) posits 
that rural development in China largely resulted from the so-called 
'local state corporatism', denoting that local governments acted in an 
entrepreneurial manner, proactively supporting local collective enter-
prises, such as setting up township and village enterprises, attracting 
investments from outside, marketing local products, and so on. Both 
Nee et al. (2007) and Baek (2005) have argued that China's economic 
policies resemble core features of a developmental state including con-
trol over ﬁnance, direct support for SOEs by the government, import 
substitution industrialization in heavy industry, a high dependence 
on export markets and a high rate of domestic savings. Bagchi (2000) 
even asserted that 'several developmental states are alive and kicking 
in East Asia. The most dynamic among them is the People's Republic 
of China'. For a state to be developmental, it must possess sufﬁcient 
autonomy so as to be able to resist myopic interest and rent-seeking 
activities by various social groups. It should also have the capacity to 
mobilize national resources and put its economic development plan 
into practice.
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On the other side is the predatory state paradigm. Rather than playing 
a contributory role in economic growth, the predatory regimes extract 
economic rents from the citizenry and prey on their own constituents.3 
James K. Galbraith, an economist at the University of Texas, went even 
farther, deﬁning a predatory state as 'a coalition of relentless opponents 
of the regulatory framework on which public purpose depends, with 
enterprises whose major lines of business compete with or encroach 
on the principal public functions of the enduring New Deal' (Galbraith 
2008: 131). In the case of China, sluggish development in rural regions 
was largely ascribed to the heavy burdens borne by Chinese peasants, 
which in turn largely resulted from the extractive activities of the gov-
ernment at different levels (Lu 1997: 113-138). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) call such a developmental–predatory 
divide the 'grabbing hand' view as opposed to the traditional 'helping 
hand' view of government. Such a dichotomy, however, has been chal-
lenged by Yongshun Cai. He found that in many cases the state makes 
irresponsible decisions and misuses resources, neither for real develop-
ment nor for predatory purposes, but to enhance its own image, thus 
resulting in a waste of public resources (Cai 2004). 
If both the developmental and predatory state paradigms have some 
value judgment inherent to them, the state capitalism and the centrally 
managed capitalism arguments are built on an empirical basis. Ian 
Bremmer (2010) argued that China was embracing a state capitalism 
approach, central to which are policies that champion state-owned ﬁrms 
and sovereign wealth funds, provide state funding to these clients to 
help them lock in long-term agreements and use the market to bolster 
the Chinese government's domestic political positions. Hence, state 
capitalism underscores the Chinese state's strategic intentions and tends 
to equalize the behaviours of Chinese companies to Beijing's strategic 
actions. 
While acknowledging that China today is a capitalist state, the cen-
trally managed capitalism (CMC) paradigm argued that the Chinese 
party–state has increasingly tightened control of the economy and 
economic activities are heavily embedded in social relations (guanxi). 
The CMC, in particular, underscores the state's control over personnel, 
organization and credits, which are also the three principal mechanisms 
making the CMC feasible (Lin 2010).
Second, regarding whether the Chinese way of developing the 
economy is unique and whether it will defy the Western liberal demo-
cratic system, scholars embracing the developmental state model tend 
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to put China into this category, and thus China's policy model is akin 
to other East Asian newly industrialized countries (Nee et al. 2007: 20). 
By contrast, Fligstein and Zhang (2009) argued that China is creating its 
own model of development. Similarly, proponents of state capitalism 
contend that China's way of development, underscoring the overriding 
role of the state and being sceptical over free markets, is quite special 
when compared with the market-driven Western economic system, 
which upholds the value of democracy, liberties and individual rights. 
With the rise of China and the 'shrinking of Western appeal as a politi-
coeconomic brand', state capitalism, or what some called 'authoritarian 
capitalism', is undermining Western capitalism, resulting in the risk of 
'the end of the free market' (Bremmer 2010; Halper 2010). But Bremmer 
(2010) was of the belief that over the long term, authoritarian capitalism 
will prove a poor rival to the Western version.
These empirical ﬁndings have signiﬁcantly enhanced our understand-
ing of the role of the Chinese state in promoting reform. The develop-
mental state at least provides some prescriptions on what a government 
should do in order to spur economic growth, whereas the predatory state 
has uncovered the side of the exploitative nature of the Chinese state, 
notwithstanding the rapid economic growth in the past decades. It is 
liable to envisage that a state's predatory intent excludes the likelihood 
of public goods provision by the 'grabbing hand'. However, according 
to Olson, instead of a short-lived 'roving bandit', the ruler, or the 'sta-
tionary bandit' may come to realize that it is in its long-term interest to 
provide the necessary public goods and 'cultivate' the private economy 
so that it has more to be extracted (Olson 1993: 567–576).
Contradictory to common views on China, both the state capitalism 
and the centrally managed capitalism theses are very insightful to re-
gard the Chinese state as a capitalist. What the state capitalism view has 
incisively discerned is the Chinese state's strategic concerns and how it 
renders support to the SOEs. What deserves mentioning is the CMC's 
in-depth analysis of the speciﬁc mechanisms through which the state 
puts organizations within China under its control. 
Yet, the above paradigms are based on the impact of state interven-
tion on the Chinese economy, which, however, cannot always remain 
so clear-cut and encompass the complex reality in China. In particular, 
a simpliﬁed development or predatory or irresponsible state cannot 
help us comprehend the state's calculations and its interactions with 
other relevant actors. As will be illustrated by what happened in the 
petroleum industry, the Chinese government does not rigidly adhere to 
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a particular scholarly convention. Although the state capitalism thesis 
highlights the Chinese government's political intentions and the CMC 
underscores government control, it is problematic to presuppose the 
state organs as a unitary entity. In fact, authoritarian as it is, the Chinese 
state is not so strong that it is immune from particularistic interests. 
Nor is the state 'staffed by agents of change who are uniﬁed by a com-
mon purpose and technical orientation' (Chan et al. 1998: 2). Indeed, 
predatory intent can be found in its management of the sector, but ap-
parently neither the predatory state nor the irresponsible state theses 
can account for what has been unfolding in China. Moreover, the above 
models, though having different emphases, are common in presuming 
a state-versus-market dichotomy, which is problematic. Drawing upon 
Chinese state involvement in the petroleum industry, this article aims 
to explore how the Chinese state intervenes in the petroleum industry 
and how it interacts with the state-owned oil companies. It is argued 
that a 'state-managed marketization' approach (SMMA) has been taken 
to manage this sector.
A Third Way of Involvement:  
State-Managed Marketization 
According to international political economy, there are two basic modes 
(market and state) running the economy and allocating resources for 
each nation state. Accordingly, the ways countries promote economic 
growth can be classiﬁed as either a market-dominated approach (MDA) 
or a state-controlled approach (SCA). MDA is deﬁned as 'one which 
relies to a signiﬁcant degree on the use of ﬂexible economic, ﬁscal and 
regulatory instruments which seek to achieve stated policy objectives 
through market signals rather than on the use of the rigid regulations 
or ''command-and-control'' type measures which mandate market out-
comes' (IEA 1996: 21). SCA denotes greater government involvement 
in the energy sector characterized by a panoply of measures such as 
'setting detailed, quantitative targets for the energy sector, subsidies 
and other ﬁnancial incentives including support for mega projects, price 
controls, government deals for the purchase of oil and other barriers to 
free trade' (IEA 1996: 14).
In the petroleum sector, the SMMA is deﬁned as a process wherein 
the state has recourse to a set of mixed means to divert the oil sector 
from state control to market operation, but in that process it is up to 
the state to decide and adjust the extent and scope of market activi-
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ties. On the one hand, more and more market ingredients have been 
ushered in, particularly into the reﬁnery and distribution chains. The 
Chinese government has to introduce more market mechanisms into 
the whole economy including the oil sector and even let the market 
play a crucial role to decide who wins and who loses for the sake of 
improving economic efﬁciency.4 It has to accommodate market forces 
due to the impact of globalization (Zheng 2004: 29-31), its own concerns 
of conserving energy, reducing its ﬁscal burdens or enriching its own 
coffers, negotiated obligations with international institutions, and the 
need to transform people's 'public action' (demands for political re-
form) to 'private interest' (economic activities) for the purpose of ruling 
legitimacy.5 Moreover, the government is aware that overprotection 
is not conducive to the growth of the national oil companies (NOCs), 
as evidenced by its woeful experience in the car industry. This entails 
market openness, such as lower or no tariffs, no quota constrictions, 
fewer or no entry/exit barriers, no policy discrimination, no subsidies, 
price formation after complete market competition, hard budget con-
straint,6 and more autonomy for oil ﬁrms in business operations, proﬁt 
allocation, pricing and investing decisions, as well as a set of laws and 
regulations preserving market order.
On the other hand, the marketization process has been initiated and 
is under the control of the government because of concerns about the 
possible destructive effects on national security, socio-political stability 
and economic development resulting from disruptions of the oil and gas 
supply and price ﬂuctuations. When perceiving that energy problems 
may engender chaos, the government will use any means available, 
including instruments of the command economy, to prevent and curb 
crisis. Hence, it is unlikely that state control would be loosened over-
night. Sometimes state control may be resumed in those deregulated 
areas, particularly when a crisis is at hand. 
How does the SMMA work in practice? The principal mechanisms 
making the SMMA feasible can be summarized as control, autonomy and 
support.7 The Chinese government tries to discipline the NOCs in four 
major ways: regulation, ownership, credit and personnel. Of particular 
importance among the instruments are the ﬁscal and taxation means, 
which directly affect the revenues of the SOEs. A second means is to 
have direct control of vital economic capital so that the party–state can 
decide where and how to use the capital. The third means is to directly 
intervene in the NOCs' pricing and investment decisions. It is up to 
the NDRC to decide when and how to adjust prices of reﬁned oil in the 
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Chinese domestic market, notwithstanding the integration of domestic 
crude oil prices with international ones. Moreover, any Chinese ﬁrm's 
foreign investment larger than US$30 million must be approved by the 
government. The fourth means that the government can use to exert its 
inﬂuence is with personnel affairs. Besides, to manage its ties with the 
SOEs, the Chinese government has employed a variety of measures that 
can directly or indirectly affect the SOEs' revenues, such as launching 
mega energy projects, imposing import bans and price controls, offering 
huge subsidies, and so forth.
Despite the government's strong hand, it has granted considerable 
autonomy to the SOEs as part of the marketization and corporatization 
efforts. They have to face hard budget constraints, take responsibility 
for output decisions and are allowed to have more retained earnings 
(Garnaut & Huang 2001: 263). Furthermore, market monopoly has been 
vested in the NOCs. The management and employees' welfare is closely 
associated with the NOCs' performance, and the advent of the market 
economy has created conditions to pursue their interests. As listed com-
panies, they are accountable to their shareholders. In that sense, the NOCs 
have a propensity to be market actors with strong incentives to maximize 
proﬁts. Nonetheless, the autonomy enjoyed by the NOCs has given them 
considerable inﬂuence over the government in pursuit of their commercial 
interests.8 As Guthrie argues, 'ﬁrms are not passive recipients of top-down 
policy—rather, they interpret, adapt, modify, and even subvert the formal 
measures that come from on high' (Guthrie 1999: 5). 
In the meantime, the government renders various forms of support 
to the SOEs in the form of policy support, diplomatic support, ﬁnancial 
support and market strategy support. Policy support is the most straight-
forward form. The government often draws upon central regulations to 
serve its political and economic purposes, such as imposing import bans, 
changing tax refunds on exported products and adjusting oil prices. 
Diplomatic support includes incorporating securing natural resources 
abroad into China's foreign strategy and the personal involvement of 
national leaders to facilitate business deals with foreign countries. In 
particular, China's permanent membership in the UN Security Council is 
another card that it can capitalize on for its oil interests. Market strategy 
support is used, given that its tremendous energy market has been a 
tool that China employs to achieve its political and economic objectives. 
As Andrews-Speed, Liao and Dannreuther (2002: 80) argued, 'China's 
energy market has been used as a carrot to inﬂuence countries to adopt 
policies which are favorable to China's perceived national interests'.
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Hence, the SMMA differs both from a state-controlled approach, 
where every business is under stringent state control, and from the 
market-dominated approach, where the market plays a deciding role 
in running the petroleum sector. With the SMMA, the state intervenes 
in the oil market for social stability, economic security and state asset 
increment, rather than merely for complete government control or for 
market efﬁciency. 
The SMMA indicates that the state has a Janus-face character, at differ-
ent times playing constructive or detrimental roles that are emphasized 
by the developmental state and predatory state respectively. As state 
capitalism argues, the SMMA admits that government support is part 
and parcel of the Chinese way of development, but unlike state capital-
ism, state support is not only found in China. It also exists widely in 
other countries, including Western countries. In fact, each successive 
US administration, for the sake of energy security, has taken a ﬁrm grip 
on the principal energy producing regions by whatever instruments 
available including military means (Chen 2008). Hence, state support 
can hardly be used as a benchmark to distinguish the Chinese way from 
others. Likewise, the SMMA shares with the CMC that government 
control is core to the Chinese way of development, but unlike the CMC, 
it acknowledges the emergence of marketization as an important trend 
in China. Moreover, it would be misleading if we only highlight gov-
ernment control over SOEs without realizing the SOEs' great autonomy 
and strong inﬂuence on the state. For a comparison between the SMMA 
and other competing models, see Table 1.
If most countries embracing a market economy can be classiﬁed as 
a state-in-market paradigm, where state interventions in economic ac-
tivities are subject to market forces, China's SMMA can be regarded as 
TABLE 1: A Comparison between the State-managed Marketization 
Approach and Other Competing Models
State-managed Marketization Approach
Similarities Differences
Developmental State The state can play a  
constructive role
The state may play a detrimental 
role
Predatory State The state can play a  
detrimental role
The state can play a constructive  
role
State Capitalism State support prevalent State support not alone in China
Centrally Managed 
Capitalism
Existence of state control: 
regulation, ownership, 
credit and personnel 
Marketization being a trend and 
the SOEs not puppets of the state. 
SOEs enjoy great autonomy and 
exert considerable inﬂuence on 
the state. 
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a market-in-state model, where China's state is superior to the market. 
A state-in-market paradigm means that the whole economy including 
trade, pricing, investment, production, etc. is organized in light of market 
principles and each actor in the market should have equal rights. The 
state may intervene in economic operations but it has to abide by market 
laws. In contrast, in the market-in-state model, the market is created by 
the state and market structure is shaped by the state. Hence, the state 
has the power to affect or even disrupt market operations in an abrupt 
manner. Within the market, not every actor has equal rights. The state 
may endow more power to some while discriminating against others, 
and it may extract rents from market participants.
Although China is moving towards a market economy and the pe-
troleum industry is no exception, notwithstanding its strategic implica-
tions, transforming the command economy, including the petroleum 
industry, is not a goal that can be reached with one step. In fact, tracing 
Chinese oil policy reform, it is easy to ﬁnd that the reform presents the 
attribute of 'one step forward, two steps back' (Manning 2000: 84). As 
Downs (2004: 4) argues, the strife between market activism and state 
control features Chinese energy security rhetoric and practice. Both 
the state and the market are brought into play, and a mix of both state 
regulation and market operations coexists in the Chinese oil sector. The 
SMMA is typical of transitional economies embracing gradualism in 
the sense that market mechanisms are allowed into the oil sector, not in 
an abrupt 'big-bang' way but in a step-by-step manner. In general, the 
Chinese state intervenes in a select few 'strategic industries' with crucial 
ﬁscal or developmental contributions; more speciﬁcally, state interven-
tion focuses more on certain 'core' segments with overall controlling 
or inﬂuential capacities within those selected industries,9 while other 
'periphery' zones have gradually been left to the market. 
Apparently, the transformation process is not without turns and 
twists, implying that some ex ante marketized zones might be returned 
to state control. This is mainly because in its effort to drive the oil sec-
tor towards the end of marketization, China also bears socioeconomic 
security in mind. In great measure, marketization in this regard is just 
a means to attain the goal of a higher degree of oil security. As such, 
the quality of state 'management' is ostensibly associated with state 
capacity. However, a strong state10 is not a sufﬁcient condition for good 
performance in 'managing marketization' in that the latter correlates with 
other factors, such as the uncontrollable nature of the market, bounded 
rationality11 and power abuse. Moreover, it is true that the government 
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endeavours to reduce oil dependency, but it remains a question mark 
whether China is a strong state in every respect regarding energy se-
curity. On and off, the government encounters considerable resistance 
in pushing its policies downwards, as discussed below.
  It is true that China's use of SMMA reﬂects gradualism, the overall 
guiding principle of Chinese reform epitomized by 'groping for stones 
to cross a river' (mozhe shitou guohe), but should we go no further, we 
might lose sight of the strategic thinking of the Chinese government, 
the opportunities and constraints it has confronted and the ongoing 
competitions in the Chinese oil market. We cannot understand why 
deregulations or re-regulations came about at certain junctures, nor 
can we tell the future direction of China's approach. The following will 
examine two cases or policy areas, namely industrial restructuring and 
oil pricing reform in the petroleum industry to account for China's use 
of the SMMA.  
SMMA through Industrial Restructuring
Selecting the 1998 restructuring as a case study is based on the following 
considerations. First, it was the largest restructuring so far in China's 
petroleum industry history in the sense that it involved not a regional 
but a nation-wide industry. Second, it has fundamentally shaped today's 
petroleum and petrochemical structure in China. The two oil giants, 
China Petroleum and Gas Corporation (CNPC), and China Petrochemi-
cal Corporation (Sinopec), are undertaking their major business in China 
primarily based on the geographic divisions set in the 1998 revamp. 
Third, it took place in special settings. At that time, most neighbouring 
countries were dealt a heavy blow due to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis and 
the Chinese petroleum industry was also negatively affected. During 
that year, mergers and restructures swept large Western oil companies. 
For instance, BP and Amoco merged into the world's third largest oil 
company in 1998. What is more important, this restructuring can help 
readers perceive the strategic thinking of the Chinese leadership. 
Before the 1998 overhaul, the petroleum industry was dominated by 
four enterprises in the 1980s, and then ﬁve from December 1996 (see 
Figure 1). Meanwhile, the Petroleum Industry Ministry and the Ministry 
of Energy were disbanded in September 1988 and March 1992 respec-
tively. Consequently, some administrative functions were assigned to 
the NOCs. Such an admixture of both business and administrative func-
tions, however, brought about a variety of problems. First, it hindered 
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the sound development of a market economy as ﬁrms were not playing 
on a level playing ﬁeld. Second, it negatively affected the establishment 
of a modern enterprise system. With direct government involvement, 
employees of these ﬁrms had no incentive to pay close heed to their 
market performance, making it difﬁcult for enterprises to be independ-
ent market actors responsible for their own proﬁts and losses. Third, it 
became a hotbed of bribery and corruption. To fulﬁl the goal of building 
a socialist market economy, a goal that has been advanced since 1992, 
China needs to take measures to address the above problems. 
The lack of a special administrative institution overseeing the petro-
leum sector not only often led to fragmented and inconsistent policies 
and regulations, but also resulted in random exploitation due to the 
poly-governance problem. Local governments often turned a blind eye 
to such chaotic operation activities. After the removal of the Energy 
Ministry, administration of national oil and gas resources was taken over 
by the State Planning Commission and later transferred to the National 
Resources Commission. Yet, the latter was merely a commission for dis-
cussion and coordination with little administrative power over national 
resources. In fact, administrative power over the petroleum industry, 
such as output, pricing, investment, credit use, product distribution, 
foreign trade and other matters, rested with different ministries, but 
there was no special government agency to look after the overall and 
long-term development of this industry. To promote local economic 
development, local governments often issued exploration and exploi-
tation licenses to local ﬁrms, in deﬁance of the law that all petroleum 
resources within Chinese territory are owned and administered by the 
state. Consequently, casual mining activities were rampant (Yan 1998: 
24-26). This severely impaired the interests of those upstream NOCs, 
which petitioned the central government to stop such contravening acts. 
Facing such a situation, however, the central government could hardly 
put an end to the locals' collusions. It had to wait for some opportunity 
to make a radical change: 'Contrary to the simple and static image of 
authoritarianism under the Chinese Communist Party, the preference 
of central bureaucrats often defer to local initiatives before staging an 
intervention' (Lin 2003: 88).
Pressures from the NOCs to exclude local ﬁrms from the petroleum 
industry helped prompt the government's reform actions, but the gov-
ernment's perception of the developing trend of this industry and its 
security concerns played a decisive role leading to the 1998 restructur-
ing. In the 1980s, CNPC and China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
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(CNOOC) were the only two entities empowered to cooperate with 
foreign investors, in onshore and offshore areas respectively. In 1996, 
the Star Petroleum Limited Corporation was established and entitled 
to such a right both onshore and offshore. Nonetheless, even without 
permission from Beijing, local governments also jumped on the band-
wagon to allow local enterprises to cooperate with foreign investors in 
petroleum exploration and development within their jurisdictions. In 
the eyes of the Chinese government, a variety of players from China 
competing to collaborate with foreign oil giants would not be good for 
China; on the one hand, not a single Chinese petroleum company could 
compete with the multinationals, and on the other hand, over-competi-
tion among Chinese NOCs substantially undermined their bargaining 
power, resulting in the Chinese side becoming the biggest loser. Moreo-
ver, such a multi-player structure made it more difﬁcult for the Chinese 
government to exercise effective supervision and administration, which 
consequently could hardly ensure reasonable utilization and effective 
protection of natural resources. 
The Chinese leadership tended to perceive expansion of an oil com-
pany as a global trend. Compared with their foreign counterparts, Chi-
nese oil companies were so weak that the total annual sales revenues of 
the three largest ones (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) was less than half 
of Exxon's (Yan 1998: 63). Considering that Western countries did not 
strictly enforce their anti-monopoly law but endorsed the mergers of 
their globally competitive oil and gas giants, Beijing felt it imperative to 
follow suit so that the Chinese companies would not be further edged 
out of the global market in the future. Also, the leadership posited that 
it was necessary for the government to help build up some Chinese 
company giants so as ultimately to construct China as a rising power. As 
the then vice premier Wu Bangguo put it, 'Our nation's position in the 
international economic order will be to a large extent determined by the 
position of our nation's large enterprises and groups' (CNPC 2000).12 
Lin (2003: 88) has expounded the three conditions for launching such 
a large-scale industrial reform, 'expected gains from further decentrali-
zation; ﬁnancial strength of the central treasury vs. the local state; and 
demonstration of feasible organizational options'. He further explained 
why 1998 was an appropriate time to initiate such an overhaul. Accord-
ing to Lin, obstacles against reform were reduced to a large extent due 
to the structural change from an economy of shortage to one of surplus 
in 1996 and oil price distortions, which led to further interest divisions 
among different parties concerned. This division provided opportunities 
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for the central state to create a new reform coalition, while new trends 
in the domestic capital market increased the central government's ex-
pectation of higher returns from corporate restructuring. 
The attitudes of CNPC and Sinopec, both of which braced for the 
overhaul, deserve mentioning. Before the reform, the price ratio between 
crude oil and reﬁned oil products in China was artiﬁcially unreasonable 
in that crude oil prices had long been kept much lower. As a result, com-
panies in the upstream had less incentive to conduct more exploration 
and production (E&P) activities owing to the substantial investments 
and high risks required. However, in order to meet the production tar-
gets set by the government, they had to enhance production by tapping 
into the existing oilﬁelds. In so doing, the percentage of water and water 
bearing compounds in the oil extracts shot up rapidly. The average rate 
in oilﬁelds onshore reached 80 per cent, with some major oilﬁelds even 
approximating 90 per cent (Yan 1998: 28). The government realized the 
serious consequences and eventually raised the prices of crude oil.13 
Hence, it was comprehensible that CNPC was constantly very active in 
restructuring the industry as the reform would enhance its autonomy 
and market share. Sinopec had long enjoyed a preferential status since 
it possessed the largest reﬁning power, but when the government 
raised the crude prices, its erstwhile glory passed away. It also wanted 
to embark on the upstream business to make up for the reﬁning losses. 
Furthermore, vertical integration would help them to avoid risks of a 
sharp proﬁt decline since their upstream and downstream businesses 
could supplement each other.
The restructuring was based on the State Council Organization Reform 
Scheme approved in the First Session of the Ninth National People's 
Congress. The scheme had two goals: one was to merge the administra-
tive functions of the Chemical Industry Ministry, CNPC, and Sinopec 
into the State Petroleum and Chemical Industry Bureau under the State 
Economic and Trade Commission. The other goal was to overhaul the 
industrial structure at that time to turn the newly restructured corpora-
tions into vertically integrated giants, as the multinationals are doing. 
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, before the 1998 overhaul, CNPC had focused 
only on oil and gas E&P and transportation, and Sinopec had barely 
concentrated on oil reﬁnery and petrochemical manufacturing. There 
were other actors competing with them, whereas neither of them had 
engaged in the distribution business including domestic marketing and 
foreign trade. After the 1998 reform, both CNPC and Sinopec not only 
were able to embark on a series of business ventures concerning oil and 
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FIGURE 1: The 1998 Overhaul of the Petroleum Industry in China
Before 1998 After 1998
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gas, but also successfully excluded many other actors from the oil and 
gas industry, although they could not exclude CNOOC and Sinochem, 
both of which remained intact.
The 1998 overhaul of the oil and gas industry employed an SMMA. 
On the one hand, the restructuring was led and organized by the central 
government and reﬂected its strategic thinking. On the other hand, the 
government expected competition in the domestic petroleum industry 
would be orderly and manageable. Hence, while divesting the admin-
istrative functions from the NOCs and turning them into market actors 
responsible for their business operations, it granted more autonomy to 
the NOCs and encouraged them to compete with each other.
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SMMA in Oil Pricing Reform
The oil price not only has a profound impact on the national economy, 
but involves interest distribution among upstream producers, down-
stream reﬁners and consumers. Price liberalization, often the ﬁrst step in 
establishing a market economy, means that 'prices had to be decontrolled 
and subsidies eliminated, in order to establish a demand-and-supply 
driven system of price determination' (Sachs and Lipton 1990: 55). This 
case study aims to analyze why the oil pricing mechanisms intertwine 
regulation with deregulation by focusing on the government's considera-
tions as well as the NOCs' motivations. Emphasis is put on the oil pricing 
systems since 1993, when China turned into a net oil importer. 
Before 1998: Pre-Integration Phases
Before 1998, there were three different types of oil pricing systems. In 
the ﬁrst stage, from 1949 to 1981, oil was sold at a single, state-control-
led price, regardless of quality. The government often deﬁned oil prices 
according to its political objectives. The second stage followed a 'three-
tiered price system', wherein market elements were introduced from 
1981 to 1994. During this period, 1993 saw a large number of state-de-
regulations, but the state re-regulated its oil pricing policy in the third 
stage, signalled by the two-track system that began in 1994. 
(1) The Three-Tiered Price System
The 'three-tiered price system' was created in 1981 primarily to address 
the capital constraints that the NOCs faced for oil E&P. Basically, under 
this system oil companies could sell their surplus crude oil at market 
prices only after they fulﬁlled the centrally mandated quota of 100 mil-
lion tons (MT). For crude oil, the three different prices were (1) 'in-quota' 
low prices; (2) 'in-quota' high price; and (3) market prices (Wang 1999: 
56). The surplus crude oil could be exported through Sinochem or sold 
domestically at market prices. 
In terms of reﬁned oil products, since 1982 the pricing system had 
two levels: 'in-quota' low prices and market prices for those products 
beyond the quota set by the state. The 'in-quota' prices mainly served 
the military, agriculture, and some large SOEs. The central government 
also relaxed control over oil trade in some provinces with surplus hard 
currencies and in the special economic zones (Pietz & Ellsworth 2000: 
12-13). However, because oil prices were under strict state control while 
most of the raw materials that the oil industry relied upon had to be 
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acquired through the market, many oil ﬁrms were at a loss, and the 
whole industry registered in the red from 1988 to 1994.
To help the petroleum industry out of the conundrum, the central 
government took two steps. One was to raise oil prices several times. 
As of 1994, domestic crude oil prices were approximately equivalent to 
77 per cent of international prices (Yan & Huang 1995). The next step 
was to give the NOCs more autonomy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
both CNPC and Sinopec were entitled to distribute 9 per cent reﬁned oil 
products and 5 per cent crude oil respectively. However, these meas-
ures did not turn the oil industry around by 1993. Consequently, cash 
starvation not only stranded oil production in the existing oilﬁelds, but 
also resulted in sluggish discovery of new oilﬁelds. Yet the government 
was still saddled with subsidizing this sector with RMB 4-5 billion (Bi 
1994). It had to resort to more radical measures.
After Deng's Southern Tour in 1992, the government undertook a 
series of decentralization measures. 'The number of production goods 
regulated by the State Price Administration was reduced from 737 to 89 
and price ceilings were removed for many goods' (Garbaccio 1994: 1-34). 
Among them, oil prices were also deregulated in great measure.
(2) Price Deregulation
In 1993 the government let the market play a decisive role in determining 
the prices of most crude oil and reﬁned oil products. It removed the low-
price quotas and allowed two-thirds of crude oil to be sold at deregu-
lated rates close to or above international levels (Andrews-Speed 2004: 
69). Also, except in a few sectors such as agriculture and the military, 
subsidized prices of oil products were phased out and the proportion 
of market-priced reﬁned oil products rose to about 65 per cent in 1993, 
from less than 10 per cent in 1983 (Wang 1999: 57). Hence, the 'three-
tiered' pricing system de facto changed into a 'two-track' system. 
The oil pricing reform can be regarded as a building block to construct 
the 'socialist market economy'. Nonetheless, government concerns over 
the long-term faltering operation of the petroleum industry, coupled 
with the pressures from the NOCs, prompted the central government to 
change policy tack. The marketization tide followed by Deng's Southern 
Tour provided an excellent opportunity to deregulate the oil sector. 
Moreover, it was the ﬁrst large-scale experiment on oil price release in 
the oil industry. As Goldstein (1992: 53) argued, the 1993 deregulation 
was a 'shock treatment on oil pricing' whose policy goals were: ﬁrst, 
reducing the waste of energy resources; second, giving greater weight 
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to market forces than administrative powers; and third, pumping funds 
into China's cash-starved oil producers. 
Nevertheless, such 'shock therapy' seemed unworkable in China be-
cause it was only the oil price levels rather than the pricing mechanisms 
that were integrated with the world prices. Moreover, only part of the oil 
prices rather than entire products were merged with the world prices. 
Consequently, the system left loopholes for oil smuggling.
(3) 1994-1998: Price Re-regulation
While the decentralization boosted rapid economic growth, it also 
engendered serious economic problems. Inﬂation skyrocketed to 26 
per cent in February 1994, from 23 per cent in January (Goldstein 1994: 
66-67), much higher than the alert baseline of 5 per cent.14 The serious 
inﬂation led to high prices, which not only affected people's lives, but 
also increased costs of production. Protests emanated from those sec-
tors that had to absorb the steep rise of input costs (Garbaccio 1994: 1). 
For instance, Sinopec used to enjoy 'in-quota' low-price crude oil for 
its reﬁneries. When the state abolished the 'in-quota' prices in January 
1993, the costs for 35-40 per cent of the crude oil Sinopec required to 
feed its reﬁneries rose up by 134 per cent (Goldstein 1993: 50-52). How-
ever, Sinopec could not make up for the rising costs through marketing 
its reﬁned oil products because most downstream proﬁts went to the 
pockets of provincial oil companies. They bought most oil products 
from Sinopec at controlled prices but could sell them at much higher 
market prices. Hence, Sinopec strongly protested the high prices it was 
suddenly forced to pay for its inputs (Goldstein 1993). 
Nevertheless, the government was confronting a policy dilemma: on 
the one hand, China needed to curb rising prices to avoid compromis-
ing economic growth and social stability; on the other hand, if China 
maintained prices of reﬁned oil lower than international prices, the 
petroleum industry could hardly recover from the monetary loss.15 
How did China cope with such a policy dilemma? In 1994, the central 
government took a command approach to resume control over price 
setting. Not only did the state abolish the two-track pricing system, but 
it again controlled the prices of both crude oil and reﬁned oil products 
in each city and province, as well as the differences between wholesale 
and retail prices. Therefore, the market was abolished. After the reform, 
the prices of the previous 'in-quota' low- and high-priced crude oil were 
increased from RMB 205/t and RMB 535/t respectively to a uniﬁed 
price of RMB 700/t, which was the ﬁrst grade crude oil. In the second 
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grade, the surplus crude oil under the three-tiered system and the crude 
oil from four small oilﬁelds with operational difﬁculties were sold at 
a uniform price of RMB 1250/t (Bi 1994). Moreover, the average crude 
oil price reached RMB 1020/t after state adjustments from May 1994 to 
December 1996, thus ending the history of long-term, low-priced crude 
oil (Fan 1999: 23). However, as shown in Table 2, the domestic crude 
price was still below the international price.     
Reﬁned oil pricing was also revised after the reform. The ex-plant 
prices (prices after reﬁning) and retail prices of the 'in-quota' and 'out-
side-quota' reﬁned oil in the 35 central cities were merged respectively 
and deﬁned by the state. The central government only stipulated the 
pricing principle on the wholesale prices in 35 cities, and the wholesale 
and retail prices in other regions, whereas it was up to each provincial 
pricing authority to decide the speciﬁc retail prices. In general, the 
average price of domestic reﬁned oil products was higher than the 
international one (see Table 2).
TABLE 2:  Price Comparison between Domestic and International Crude 
and Reﬁned Products in 1994
Type of oil
International Domestic
US$/b US$/t RMB/t RMB/t
Crude oil 18.00 129.24 1,124.39 818.00
Gasoline 23.40 197.20 1,715.64 2,350.00
Diesel 20.20 151.50 1,318.05 1,900.00
Source: Yan & Huang (1995)
The state put stringent controls on oil ﬂows. The State Planning Com-
mission carried out uniform allocation over domestic oil production as 
well as imports of crude and reﬁned oil. Except for self-use, reasonable 
wear and tear, and state-planned exports, crude oil produced by CNPC 
must be delivered to the reﬁneries or petrochemicals of Sinopec for 
processing. Oilﬁelds were not permitted to exchange oil for electricity 
or other utilities; nor did they need to supply crude oil to their localities. 
The oil reﬁneries were forbidden to process crude oil supplied by clients 
in various forms and sell reﬁned oil products directly to the market 
(Chu & Li 2004: 71-72). In addition, oil import and export businesses 
were assigned to certain companies, while other entities without a state 
license were forbidden to conduct trade in oil.
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To cope with the glut of imported oil in the domestic market, the state 
directly imposed a temporary import ban on both crude and reﬁned oil 
in early 1994. Compared with 1992, the imported reﬁned oil products 
in 1993 more than doubled, from 7.68 million tons (Mt) to 17.41 Mt, 
while crude oil imports rose from 11.35 Mt to 15.64 Mt (Li 1996). As a 
result, Sinopec suffered a lot as coastal regions preferred purchasing the 
cheaper imported oil of better quality than the oil from northern China. 
What is more, the import surge made China a net oil importer and forced 
China to pay a bill of US$ 2.3 billion in 1993 (Goldstein 1994). That was 
why Sinopec strongly pressured the government to intervene. 
In sum, the government assertively imposed an import ban to protect 
the domestic oil industry and increased prices of both crude and reﬁned 
oil, thus alleviating to some extent the capital-starvation problem in the 
oil industry. The state's re-regulation also straightened out the oil market 
and effectively beat oil speculation. However, due to the disjuncture 
between domestic and foreign energy markets, a price gap emerged 
every time international oil prices ﬂuctuated, which still left loopholes 
for illegal oil smuggling. Further, price setting by the state brought about 
new problems. On the one hand, it reduced market actors' autonomy 
and strangled the ﬂedging competition among petroleum ﬁrms, thereby 
making them rely on the government when they went into the red. On 
the other hand, according to the new pricing mechanism, crude and 
reﬁned oil prices were different between different provinces but the 
same within each province, which could not fully incorporate transport 
costs since each province is so large. Also, oil prices could hardly reﬂect 
the supply and demand ﬂuctuations due to changes of climates and 
seasons, considering that the price of some reﬁned oil products, such 
as low-freezing-point diesel oil, was kept unchanged for a whole year 
(Research Group 1995). Therefore, oil prices could hardly function ap-
propriately for resource allocation.   
Why did the state take such a command approach in 1994? The major 
reason was the Chinese leadership was afraid that high inﬂation and 
rising prices would jeopardize social stability. Nonetheless, after the re-
form, the serious inﬂation problem had not been resolved but persisted. 
Inﬂation became so serious in the 1990s that the central government 
had to secure a 'soft landing' solution.16 The government expected to 
protect the domestic market, but it adopted a radical way to remove 
all market oil prices. Moreover, in those areas where it was necessary 
for the government to regulate, such as oil industry policies, overseas 
development strategies and oil market construction, state regulation 
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was not in place. Hence, 'the oil price controls appear to have only one 
obvious beneﬁciary: the state oil monopoly' (Wang 1999: 60).
1998–Present: Price Integration
In the fourth stage comes the era of oil pricing in line with world oil 
prices, from 1998 to date. This pricing reform started in June 1998 after 
the State Council promulgated the Plan of Crude Oil and Reﬁned Oil 
Product Pricing Reform, which stipulated that the prices of domestic 
crude and reﬁned oil products should be in line with international oil 
prices.17 It is clear that integrating with international oil prices might 
expose China to foreign risks. In view of the strategic implication of oil, 
oil price volatilities and China's concerns about national security, why 
is Beijing willing to expose itself to foreign impacts? 
This is mainly because oil pricing reform was part and parcel of the 
overall petroleum industry overhaul in 1998. According to Han Huifang, 
vice director-general of the Department of Prices, State Development and 
Planning Commission (SDPC), such integration has been determined by 
China's oil resource endowment and the status quo of the oil industry. 
As China has to count on foreign oil imports, price integration could 
instruct domestic ﬁrms to make full use of the international market. 
This in turn could not only ensure oil supplies to China, but also be 
conducive to protecting domestic resources. Also, with its entry into the 
WTO, the Chinese energy market is set to be connected with the global 
one. Hence, only integrating with the international market could boost 
the development of domestic ﬁrms so that they could compete with the 
oil multinationals (Price Theory & Practice 2000: 10-12). 
Another factor that spurred this reform was that the differences 
between the domestic and foreign prices provided opportunities for il-
legal oil trafﬁcking, thereby exerting greater pressure to dismantle the 
artiﬁcial price distortion and integrate domestic prices with international 
ones. Due to the sharp price gap in the ﬁrst half of 1997 (the average 
domestic price was US$ 34.2 per barrel (/b) and only US$ 17/b in the 
international market in March 1997), China's customs seized 62,000 
metric tons of smuggled reﬁned oil, valued at RMB 133 million (US$ 
16 million) (China Business Information Network 1997). 
The 1998 oil price reform had pushed the NOCs closer to the market, 
in tandem with some protective measures.18 Overnight, domestic oil 
companies had been compelled to accept the price pressures and in-
creasing competition from foreign oil giants. While this demonstrates 
the determination of the Chinese government to persist in its reform 
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and opening up, such a move did shock the long-protected NOCs. They 
had to pay close heed to production cost reduction and market changes. 
Nonetheless, it was not a fatal blow for the NOCs, because they have 
strengthened their monopoly in the Chinese market. As Kennedy (2003: 
3) suggested, the NOCs are not merely price-takers; rather, they try to 
inﬂuence state policy making, either through intermediaries such as 
business associations or through direct lobbying. As a result, China's 
retail market for reﬁned oil was inaccessible to private investors until 
December 2005 and the whole market in December 2006, and the NOCs 
have de facto gained more power to set oil prices. 
While China's deeper involvement in the global market has increased 
international competition, it has been exposed to foreign impact more 
frequently. The government still has misgivings for fear that foreign 
inﬂuence might imperil social stability. Hence, Beijing found itself in 
a predicament: while it had to integrate the domestic oil market with 
the outside, it expected that foreign impacts could be under its control. 
The government 'was reluctant to completely deregulate product prices 
out of a desire to maintain prices that are not ''too low'' to protect the 
domestic oil industry and not ''too high'' to prevent social instability and 
to curb inﬂationary pressures' (Downs 2004: 180-181). By the same token, 
the SDPC also underscored that domestic crude oil should be sold at a 
slightly lower price than overseas crude for the purpose of encouraging 
Chinese reﬁneries to purchase domestic crude (Oil & Gas Journal 1998). 
This was perhaps a conciliatory carrot for Sinopec in order to reduce 
obstacles against the price reform considering that Sinopec had to pay a 
higher bill for feedstock and that most of its reﬁneries were uneconomic 
in scale and uncompetitive vis-à-vis foreign counterparts. 
The 1998 import ban was another typical case indicating the gov-
ernment's eclectic approach. China imposed another ban on gasoline 
and diesel imports in September 1998 to protect the NOCs, lest they be 
edged out by the ﬂood of cheaper oil from foreign countries. Before the 
1997-1998 ﬁnancial crises, a continuous price decline enlarged the gap 
between Chinese domestic and international oil prices. For instance, in 
the second half of 1998, domestic gasoline and diesel prices were two to 
three times higher than the comparable products in Singapore (Lu 1999). 
Lower international oil prices and an oil glut in neighbouring countries 
had stimulated massive oil imports into China, both legally and illegally. 
As a result, large quantities of domestic reﬁned products sat unsold. 
Accordingly, domestic crude oil producers had to cut their production. 
Moreover, worldwide oil prices declined, adversely affecting Chinese 
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oil exports and foreign exchange earnings. Consequently, the cheaper 
foreign oil had threatened the viability of the NOCs. Rather than taking 
advantage of the cheaper foreign oil to fuel the economy, the government 
opted to fence off the domestic oil industry from international compe-
tition by imposing import bans and cracking down on oil smuggling. 
Were the domestic oil industry to be ﬂooded with foreign oil products, 
it not only meant the loss of billions of dollars worth of revenues from 
the oil industry, but it would also lead to unemployment. 
The oil pricing mechanism since 1998 exposed a grave deﬁciency. 
Because oil prices in China were based on the average price on the 
Singapore market in the previous month, any oil product suppliers 
or even consumers could guess the price trend in the next month. The 
over-transparent pricing mechanism resulted in over-speculation in the 
domestic petroleum market.
To redress this problem, the central government made two changes on 
17 October 2001. First, domestic reﬁned oil prices would not directly be 
pegged with international market rates. Rather, unless the international 
reﬁned oil prices ﬂuctuated beyond a range of 8 per cent, domestic oil 
prices would not be adjusted. Second, domestic reﬁned oil prices would 
be integrated with the market prices in Singapore, Rotterdam and New 
York, rather than only use Singapore prices. Accordingly, reﬁned oil 
prices would be adjusted at unannounced times rather than each month 
(Chu & Li 2004). It was up to the SDPC to decide when and in what range 
to frame the domestic prices of gasoline and diesel oil. The crude oil 
pricing system remains the same, albeit it is composed of a benchmark 
price and a premium.19 This mechanism was not so transparent as the 
previous one, but it was widely regarded as favouring the NOCs and 
thus a kind of anti-market arrangement (Lin 2003). 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has taken some measures to 
defend the interests of the NOCs with its accession into the WTO. In 
October 2001, Beijing stipulated that all gas stations to be built in China 
must be controlled or fully invested by either CNPC or Sinopec, imply-
ing that private investors can invest in gas stations only in the form of 
a joint venture with either of the Chinese companies. At the same time, 
the government has formally released control over the fuel oil price and 
let it ﬂoat on the market. In 2004, the state further abolished the quotas 
of fuel oil imports and exports. 
In October 2006, the government stopped pegging reﬁned oil prices 
with prices in the Singapore, Rotterdam and New York markets and 
decided to use the average price of crude oil in Brent, Dubai and Mi-
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nas as the benchmark, plus domestic average processing costs and 
reasonable proﬁts. In May 2009, the government decided not to adjust 
domestic prices of reﬁned oil unless the range of the average prices of 
crude oil in the international markets is greater than 4 per cent for 22 
working days.
Yet these successive reforms have not resolved the over-transpar-
ency, time-lag and rigidity problems of the oil pricing system. This 
system de facto is merely an international integration in oil price levels, 
but has not fulﬁlled the goal of integrating price-shaping mechanisms. 
One pronounced problem is that domestic oil prices passively follow 
international prices. To some extent, this system could respond to the 
international oil price ﬂuctuations, but the response comes in a tardy 
manner. Particularly, domestic oil prices can hardly reﬂect the supply 
and demand relations and domestic change of energy consumption 
structure in a timely fashion, let alone convey the supply and demand 
information in the domestic oil market to the world market in the form 
of price signals. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The role of the state in driving development has attracted wide attention 
and most studies focus on the relationship between the state and the 
market. Initially, scholars focused on whether the state should intervene 
in the market or not, forming the debate between state minimalists and 
state interventionists. Later, academia's attention shifted to the ques-
tion of the extent to which the state should be involved in a modern 
economy, creating two new opposite paradigms: developmental state 
versus predatory state. The developmental state model in particular 
has been widely adopted to explain the economic takeoff in East Asian 
countries. This model, however, has been subject to criticism by both 
neo-statists and neo-pluralists. The neo-statists, represented by Peter 
Evans and Linda Weiss, argue that close public–private networks or 
business associations, rather than simply state autonomy, are key for 
effective governance and thus economic growth (Evans 1995; Weiss 
1998). The neo-pluralists have gone even further to argue for a state-
in-society approach, stressing that states are part of societies and states 
vary in their effectiveness based on their ties to society. For instance, in 
developmental states in East Asia, the state is 'strong' because it has few 
ties to society. The revisionist approaches, like the developmental state 
model, follow the same logic of 'an essential state–society dichotomy 
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which contrasts with the observable nature of markets as mechanisms 
of governance' (Underhill & Zhang 2005: 44).
Taking the market as a proxy for 'society', Underhill and Zhang (2005) 
have developed a state–market condominium model, which sees the 
state and market as an integrated ensemble of governance where the 
interests of market agents are integrated into the state. The state–mar-
ket condominium model only portrays the ideal situation where the 
state and the market coexist symbiotically and neither competes for the 
'commanding highs'. However, as two different kinds of  'authorities' 
for distributing resources, boundaries do exist between them although 
the 'line' that sets them apart may differ in different countries. Sustained 
economic development of a country will be jeopardized if its govern-
ment tries to fully replace the market to allocate resources, as veriﬁed by 
China's command economy system. Meanwhile, the market per se has 
an inherent drive for expansion, trying to go across national boundaries 
and even defy the authority of a state. Although the role of the state 
differs, most countries embracing the market economy can be classiﬁed 
as the state-in-market paradigm, where state interventions in economic 
activities are subject to market forces. 
China, in contrast, is taking a different way. The measures that China 
has taken present the attribute of SMMA in that they are in a wide spec-
trum between market domination and state control. The extent of state 
involvement differs in different energy policies and projects. In the case 
of institutional reform, while the state has strengthened its regulatory 
power and reshaped market structure in favour of a handful of NOCs 
through the 1998 restructuring, it has started the process of oil price 
integration and introduced some market competition among the NOCs. 
It also endowed them with greater autonomy to operate on their own 
rather than intervening in their routine business through administrative 
mandates. While carrying out thorough restructuring of the Chinese oil 
market with the aim of reducing the competition for the newborn oil 
mammoths, the state does not reject market competition and exchange 
activities between and within the Chinese ﬁrms themselves. Thus, the 
domestic market has become a powerhouse for the Chinese oil giants.
By way of an SMMA, the Chinese government embraces market com-
petition to enhance industrial production, improve corporate efﬁciency 
and encourage technical injection and innovation. In the meantime, the 
government tries to get market operation under its control, fearing that 
wild market competition will disrupt economic order or bring about 
socio-political turmoil. Hence, within China's policy packages it is easy 
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to ﬁnd such a Janus-faced character. For instance, while introducing 
some market competition within and among the NOCs in the petro-
leum sector, the government tries to empower its SOEs and devise a 
petroleum market structure, such as determining the number of major 
market players, delimiting their market share and stipulating what kind 
of businesses they can embark on. While integrating domestic crude oil 
prices with the international ones, Beijing still holds the reins over the 
prices of reﬁned oil products. While allowing the entry of private and 
foreign investments in some projects, China often sets a limit on the 
locations and their shares, for instance, foreign investment in offshore 
E&D in China requires collaboration with CNOOC. Private gas sta-
tions have been permitted to embark on the retail business of reﬁned 
oil products, but they have no other options but to get the oil products 
from either CNPC or Sinopec. The government will turn to the instru-
ments of a command economy whenever it feels it necessary, such as 
the direct import bans in 1994 and 1998. Hence, China's SMMA can be 
regarded as a market-in-state model. In stark contrast with many other 
market economies where the market is above or at least equal to the 
state, China's state is superior to the market. 
A simple dichotomy of a developmental or predatory model appar-
ently can hardly capture the dynamism of China's approach in running 
the petroleum industry. First, development is not always the overrid-
ing goal in China's political economic ecology. As the government has 
constantly underscored, 'reform, development and stability are highly 
correlated, but stability is a prerequisite and guarantee for the other 
two goals. In the absence of stability, China could hardly make any 
achievement and what China has achieved would come to nought as 
well' (Hu 2011). This means that stability cannot be sacriﬁced for the sake 
of any reform or development measure. Second, with the emergence 
of a plurality of interest groups, the society has become more divided 
and fragmented. As a result, development for some is not necessarily 
conducive to progress for others. For instance, the import ban in 1998 
aiming to preserve the interest of China's NOCs resulted in a surge of 
energy costs for numerous manufacturers and exporters. Third, some-
times it is hard to tell whether the government's role is developmental 
or not. On some occasions, the government was reluctant to allow the 
prices of domestic oil products to fully go with the surging international 
oil prices for fear that would jeopardize China's exports or push up in-
ﬂation. On other occasions, the government maintained high oil prices 
notwithstanding a sharp decline of oil prices on the international market, 
shen.indd   54 09-04-2013   12:46:25
_________________________________________________________________________55
________________________________________________ State-Managed Marketization
in an attempt to keep the NOCs' returns high. In a nutshell, drawing on 
either the developmental state paradigm or the predatory model can 
hardly reﬂect the government's complex motives. Thanks to its embrace 
of a set of different goals under different circumstances, Beijing tends to 
prioritize different goals, and much depends on the state's perception 
regarding whether state retreat would jeopardize social and political 
security or not. Ostensibly it is not merely concerned with the objective 
of development. 
Inherent in the state capitalism model is the implication that state-
entrusted actors are instrumental to the state and that they will obedi-
ently follow state directives, so that the state can effectively carry out 
its policies. Indeed, the Chinese government expects that its NOCs will 
be subject to state will and want to put marketization under its control, 
but the effectiveness of its management is questionable. Not only does 
the Chinese general public have growing dissatisfaction with the SOE 
monopolies as well as growing income disparity aggravated by those 
monopolies, but ironically, the NOCs, notwithstanding their state own-
ership, do not align themselves with the government's elaborate plans. 
In fact, they often have their own priorities and subsequently the role 
they want to play, which is not necessarily in conformity with the state's 
view. The NOCs have been deprived of administrative functions in the 
1998 industrial reform, but at the same time, that separation does not 
amount to saying they have detached from the government's energy 
policy process; on the contrary, by virtue of their monopoly, oil expertise, 
market information, political clout, close liaisons with the leadership, 
big largesse to the government, and government's industrial policy of 
bolstering some large SOEs, they have gained stronger inﬂuence in 
both the Chinese energy policy process and the domestic market. In 
pursuit of their commercial interests, the NOCs may even shirk their 
social responsibilities and dodge government mandates.20 As Naughton 
and Yang argue: 
Like governments in all transitional economies, China's leaders abandoned 
crude but powerful tools of government resource allocation before market-
friendly indirect and regulatory institutions were available. Inevitably, 
government effectiveness declined and the central government's ﬁnancial 
prowess steadily eroded. The Chinese government simply seemed ill 
equipped to carry out the tasks demanded of it in the new economic 
environment. Even more troubling, the Chinese government frequently 
seemed unable to override particularistic, regional, and sectional interests. 
(Naughton & Yang 2004: 1-2)
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Further studies are called for with regard to why and how the SMMA 
has been formulated. 
Shaofeng CHEN is an associate professor from the School of International 
Studies, Peking University. His research interests cover energy security, global 
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NOTES
1  This article is based on a paper presented at the conference on 'Globalization and 
Public Sector Reforms in India and China', at Copenhagen Business School, 23-24 
September 2011. The author appreciates the constructive comments made by Pro-
fessor Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, the two anonymous reviewers, Chen Gang and other 
conference participants, but he is solely responsible for any errors.
2  See, for example, Segal and Thun 2001: 557-588; Zweig 1994: 253-274.
3  See, for example, Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Rotberg 2004: 6.
4  It is said that successful industrial ﬁrms worldwide have some common features: 
'ﬁrst, the overwhelming majority are privately owned. … In addition, competitive 
ﬁrms devote much effort to continuously enhancing efﬁciency in small and large 
ways. …' (See Yusuf, Nabeshima, and Perkins 2006: 20-21). 
5 See Hirschman 1982. Considering that market openness beneﬁts the society as con-
sumers have more choices and face lower costs, it is also a way to vent social indigna-
tion towards the serious social disparity and oil shortages derived from the NOCs' 
monopolies. The industrial monopoly problem, including the NOCs' monopoly, has 
been widely rebuked in China because it reduces market efﬁciency, intensiﬁes social 
inequality, abuses the monopoly power, etc. See Yu 2006; Cao 2006.
6  'Hard budget constraint' means that ﬁrms assume full responsibility for whatever 
decisions they make and the government will not bail them out for the losses they 
incur. 
7   Parts of the elaborations on the mechanisms are adapted from Chen 2009.
8  To learn how the NOCs exert inﬂuence on the state, see Chen (2009) and Chen 
(2011).
9  In terms of the oil industry, state ownership dominance, the upstream business, 
pricing power, management personnel, taxing power, etc. are such 'core' zones.
10  According to Weiss (1998: 26), a strong state possesses three core capacities: 'the ability 
to formulate policy goals and evolve strategies for implementing them independent 
of societal pressures; the ability to alter the behavior of important domestic groups 
in order to further its policies; and the ability to restructure the domestic environ-
ment (e.g. property rights and industrial structure) in pursuit of its goals.'
11  Simon (1957: xxiv) proposed the notion in 1957 in countering the rational analysis 
made by Anderson (1991: 1-24). 'Bounded rationality' means that an agent's behavior 
is intendedly rational, but only limitedly so'. Rationality basically means to purse an 
optimal goal with the resources available. 
12  Speech at the Inauguration of the Two Largest Corporations, 27 July 1998 (CNPC 
2000). 
13  One important measure was to integrate domestic crude price with international 
prices for the ﬁrst time in 1998.
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14  The consumer price index (CPI) is an index to measure the average price movements 
of various goods and services purchased by households throughout the country. The 
index shows changes in the total amount of expenditure required to purchase the 
equivalent goods and services purchased by households in the base year, setting the 
consumption structure (Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication, Japan, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/cpi/1585.htm#Q01). 
According to the Chinese economist, Xu Hongyuan, CPI within 5 per cent is normal, 
5-9 per cent indicates moderate inﬂation, and above 9 per cent is serious inﬂation 
(Wen 2004).
15  Goldstein has set out these contradictions: 1) raising subsidized energy prices vs 
ﬁghting inﬂation; 2) injecting competition and breaking up the state energy behe-
moths; boosting domestic oil production to minimize import dependence vs ceding 
control of its oilﬁelds to foreigners. See Goldstein 1994.
16  Soft landing can be deﬁned as inﬂation reduction without economic growth and 
employment collapse.
17  For details of the pricing mechanism, refer to Oil & Gas Journal 1998.
18  Measures included: excluding the onshore upstream from fully opening to foreign 
investors; allowing the NOCs to aggressively pre-empt domestic retail stations 
before the market openness deadlines; and adopting the 'go out' strategy.
19  The benchmark price is in line with the FOB cost plus tariff of comparable crude 
oil in the international market in the last month. FOB stands for free on board, 
meaning that the seller pays for delivering the goods to the port of shipment and 
the loading costs, while the buyer needs to pay other costs such as cost of marine 
freight transport, insurance, unloading, and transportation from the arrival port to 
the ﬁnal destination.  
20  For detailed explanations and an example, see Chen 2008 and Chen 2009.
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